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Who will guard the guardians 
of neuroscience?
Firing the neuroethical imagination
Raymond De Vries
Brain science is big. With the help of politicians, neuroscientists and the media, the brain has captured 
the public imagination. In late 2006 and 
early 2007, readers of The New York Times 
learned the difference between a “tightwad’s 
brain” and a “spendthrift’s brain” or how our 
“neurological circuits stop [us] from buying 
a George Foreman grill but not a Discovery 
Channel colour-changing mood clock” 
(Tierney, 2007); the link between addictive 
behaviour and a part of the brain known 
as the insula (Carey, 2007); and how “mir-
ror neurons”—a sort of “neural WiFi” that 
alters our physiology by tracking the emo-
tional flow, movement and intentions of the 
people around us—can promote healing 
(Goleman, 2006). 
The brain is now seen as the seat of 
our being, the centre of the self, our sec-
ular soul, the source of our conscience 
and our consciousness. Bioethicists have 
monitored this interest in the brain and 
are now parsing important ethical ques-
tions brought about by neuroscience. 
What are the implications of neuroscience 
for notions of the self, agency and respon-
sibility? How will/should neuroscience 
influence social policy? How will/should 
neuroscience be used in clinical settings? 
How will/should the findings of neuro-
science be communicated to the public? 
(Illes & Bird, 2006; Marcus, 2002).
Ethical concerns with aspects of neuro-
science together with cultural ideas about 
the special importance of the brain—
Roskies (2002) calls it “neuroessential-
ism”—have given us a new subspecialty in 
bioethics: neuro ethics. Now complete with 
its own professional association and jour-
nal, it joins two other fledgling specialty 
fields in bioethics: genethics and nanoeth-
ics. This partitioning into smaller, more 
focused specialties, although sociologically 
predictable, is not pleasing to all bioethi-
cists. Several believe that bioethics—itself a 
relatively new profession—is not yet ready 
for a subdivision: “What remains to be 
demonstrated is the validity of [the] claim 
that advances in neuroscience require a 
wider perspective” (Knoppers, 2005) and 
“…it is not clear that the conceptual tools 
used to study ‘neuro ethics’ are really differ-
ent than those generally used for the study 
of ethics” (Wilfond & Ravitsky, 2005).
Speaking “against hyphenated ethics”, 
Parens & Johnston (2006) point out that 
“proceeding as if [neuro-ethics, gen-ethics, 
and nano-ethics] were discrete arenas of 
ethical inquiry risks wasting time” and also 
risks incoherence. Their concern with the 
balkanization of bioethics is interesting 
to sociologists—it is revealing that a pro-
fession that was recently known as ‘bio-
ethics’ now wishes to limit the hyphenation 
of its work—but it does not get to the heart 
of the matter of neuroethics: what fires the 
neuroethical imagination?
My analysis of the work of neuro-ethicists is part of a long tradi-tion that asks quis custodiet ipsos 
custodies—who will guard the guardians? 
Who will watch the watchers? This tradition 
extends from Plato, to first-century Roman 
poet Juvenal, to that modern fictional ‘every-
man’ Homer Simpson. When Homer was 
caught up in a vigilante movement, he was 
challenged by his precocious daughter, Lisa: 
“Dad, don’t you see you’re abusing your 
power like all vigilantes? I mean, if you’re 
the police, who will police the police?” His 
answer: “I dunno. Coast Guard?”
A more recent and less whimsical example 
of this problem comes from the USA, where 
political analysts suggest that the recent fall 
from grace of the Republican Party resulted 
from the failure of the systems of checks and 
balances. The authors of the US Constitution 
created three branches of government—
executive, legislative and judicial—with the 
express purpose of each checking the others. 
Between 2001 and 2006, the Republican 
Party controlled all three branches; with no 
one ‘watching the watchers’, the govern-
ment suffered through an ill-conceived and 
mismanaged war, an incompetent response 
to the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, and 
several political and sexual scandals.
Although all agree on the importance of 
watching the watchers, the phrase itself 
indicates the difficulty of the task: watching 
the watchers creates the problem of infinite 
regression. We sociologists of bioethics—
whose work it is to describe the emergence, 
organization and influence, or lack thereof, 
of a profession whose work it is to watch 
and to assess the work of doctors and life 
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scientists—find ourselves in an awkward 
position. If we are watching bioethicists who 
are watching doctors, who is watching us?
Good question. The goal of a sociology 
of bioethics—or, in this case, neuro ethics—
is to understand better the organization of 
moral life (De Vries et al, 2007). It is not 
the goal to hoist bioethicists by their own 
petard, to write an exposé or to otherwise 
undermine their work. We believe that our 
research will be useful to those we study, 
not because that is our intent, but because 
it will reveal previously unrecognized fea-
tures and consequences of the social arena 
in which bioethics operates. The small but 
growing body of research on the ‘regulatory 
creep’ of research ethics committees shows 
how ethics reviews of research involving 
humans, which were begun with noble 
intent, have expanded in predictable ways 
that have clouded their original mission.
If we are to understand what fires the neuroethical imagination—how the field is organized and the content of its 
work—we must listen to the stories that 
neuroethics tells about itself. In particular, it 
is important to hear neuroethicists describe 
how their branch of bioethics came to be.
To the layperson there is only one story 
of the origins of bioethics and its daughters 
neuroethics, genethics and nanoethics: the 
technology story. In this account, bioethics 
emerged in response to new technologies 
that brought with them unprecedented and 
complicated ethical questions that were 
too vexing for the average health practi-
tioner or life scientist to answer without 
expert guidance. In some cases, this story 
is elaborated by adding accounts of over-
enthusiastic and/or irresponsible scientists 
who subjected unknowing patients and 
‘volunteers’ to dangerous therapies and 
experiments. The main idea of this standard 
version of the rise of bioethics is that sci-
ence and technology were growing rapidly, 
and could no longer be controlled by prac-
titioners and researchers.
Most histories of neuroethics are vari-
eties of the technology story. Illes & Bird 
(2006) place the history of neuroeth-
ics squarely in the standard account of 
bio ethics that runs from the Nuremberg 
Code in 1947, to the 1964 Declaration of 
Helsinki, to the Tuskegee Syphilis Study in 
the mid-twentieth century, to the Belmont 
Report in 1979 (Farah, 2005; Bosch, 2006).
It is perhaps too much to expect that 
neuroethicists are also social historians. 
However, other accounts of the rise of 
bioethics do exist. These alternative histo-
ries not only provide a richer understand-
ing of the origins of the ethics disciplines, 
but also point to different directions for 
the work of these new professionals. For 
example, Stevens (2000) tells a different, 
slightly more cynical, story about the tech-
nology–bioethics connection, asserting that 
bioethics is nothing more than the current 
incarnation of a long-standing American 
“ambivalence about technology”. 
Stevens concludes that bioethics estab-
lished its institutional home by helping to 
calm public fears about the relatively 
recent ability of doctors to sustain the “liv-
ing dead” and by providing the ethical 
scaffolding that allowed doctors and 
researchers to escape the difficult moral 
problems associated with organ transplan-
tation and the end of life. Unlike the con-
ventional technology story, in which 
bioethicists are cast as the guardians who 
oversee and regulate doctors and scientists, 
Stevens describes bioethicists as less-than-
critical allies of medicine and medical sci-
ence. She concludes her history with a 
question: “Bioethics may ultimately be suc-
cessful in helping to alleviate national anxi-
eties about the right to die or in midwifing 
developments as disturbing as the cloning 
of a human being. But will it be able to free 
itself from the sources that help generate 
the dilemmas it seeks to resolve?”
Others have pointed out that the appear-
ance of new technologies cannot, by itself, 
explain the birth of bioethics. Emanuel 
(1991) reminds us that questions gener-
ated by new technology are not new, rather 
they “are as old as man and medicine”. 
Medicine has introduced new machines 
and techniques regularly during the past 
century, many of which have reframed or 
created new moral questions. Furthermore, 
the mere presence of technology did not 
demand the creation of a bioethical spe-
cialty to act as the arbiter of ethical ques-
tions. Several existing occupations could 
have risen to the call: lawyers, the clergy 
and social workers routinely give counsel 
in matters of life and death, and were avail-
able to advise on the use of new technology 
in the 1960s and 1970s.
Why is it important for neuroethicists to 
have a more nuanced understanding of the 
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history of their field? To the extent that they 
believe the techno-origin myth of their pro-
fession, they fail to see the larger context 
that gave rise to the specialty of bioethics. 
They are less inclined to appreciate the way 
in which funding sources, and the structure 
of industry and academic research, shape 
bioethics and neuro ethics. Moreover, they 
ignore insights from the sociology of the 
professions that call attention to the ten-
dency of occupational groups to become 
self-promoting and protective. Under-
standing both the nature of their social 
license—to stand in the gap between medi-
cine and its patients—and the ease with 
which that license can be co-opted by the 
“medical–industrial complex” (Relman, 1980) 
will make neuro ethicists more reflective 
about their roles.
Neuroethicists often compare their work 
with the bioethics work that accompanied 
the Human Genome Project, and call for a 
similar programme that mirrors the funding 
set aside to study the ethical, legal and 
social implications of the genome project 
(Illes & Racine, 2005; Roskies, 2002). 
Although it might seem wise for neuro ethics 
to make these organizational and intellec-
tual links to the established tradition of 
bioethics, it diminishes the potential oppor-
tunity to rethink the well-worn and tired 
ideas of bioethics. A cadre of new thinkers, 
and a new and unique field of study, should 
help bioethicists to rethink the way in which 
the system of principles (principlism) is 
used and misused. It should also challenge 
the concepts of the field that are taken for 
granted, such as the distinction between 
invasive and non-invasive procedures or 
the celebration of autonomy over pater-
nalism. But instead of bringing new 
insights and breathing fresh life into 
understanding the ethical problems of the 
life sciences, neuroethics has saddled 
itself with mainstream bioethics.
Neuroethics was formally organ-ized into a society in May 2006. The Stanford Report, an online 
newspaper for the community of Stanford 
University (CA, USA), offers a brief descrip-
tion of the meeting at which the decision 
was taken to found the Neuroethics Society: 
“On a recent foggy day at the Asilomar con-
ference center in Pacific Grove, [CA, USA] 
13 experts in ethics, neurology, law and 
clinical medicine tipped their champagne 
glasses to celebrate the birth of a new soci-
ety. The newly minted Neuroethics Society 
gives some heft to a field that Stanford 
researchers helped found in 2002… Topics 
addressed by neuroethics include the use 
of imaging techniques to predict brain dis-
eases or personality traits, how researchers 
respond to anomalies found in the scans 
of healthy patients and the long-term use 
of brain altering drugs. The group got fund-
ing from the Dana Foundation to form the 
society” (Stanford Report, 2006). 
As the report points out, organized 
interest in neuroethics pre-dates the crea-
tion of the Neuroethics Society. In 2002, 
researchers from Stanford University and 
the University of California, San Francisco 
(UCSF), USA, held a meeting entitled 
‘Neuroethics: Mapping the Field’, which 
brought together scientists, ethicists, 
humanists and social-policy experts to 
reflect on the implications of current and 
ongoing work in neuroscience. Several 
speakers at the conference explained that 
neuroethics was not new, and offered var-
ied genealogies of the field: one began 
with Plato ( Jonsen, 2002), and another 
with a meeting of poets and writers includ-
ing Lord Byron, Percy Shelley and Mary 
Wollstonecraft Godwin held in a cottage 
on Lake Geneva in the summer of 1816 
(Safire, 2002).
Zach Hall offered a more prosaic version 
of the birth of neuroethics, describing a trip 
made by William Safire, New York Times col-
umnist and Chairman of the Dana Foundation 
(New York, NY, USA), to the Mission Bay 
Campus of UCSF. Hall, who is a member of 
the faculty there, recalled showing Safire 
around: “…we were talking about all the 
brain research that would be going on there. 
I said that we also hoped to have a bioethics 
center. As we were talking about the need for 
discussion of these issues with respect to the 
brain, Bill suddenly turned to me and said, 
neuroethics. It was like that magic moment—
‘plastics,’ in the movie The Graduate. Bill 
said, ‘neuroethics,’ and I thought, ‘that’s it.’ It 
was a recognition that these problems are so 
serious and have such broad implications 
that they deserve a special designation” 
(Hall, 2002).
This transition from an idea to an 
organization underscores the importance 
of ‘acquiring a past’. As with the link to 
the history of bioethics, the founding of 
the Neuroethics Society at Asilomar lends 
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credibility to the new academic enterprise 
by creating a connection to the well-known 
meeting of geneticists that was held there 
in 1975. One of the participants at the 
1975 meeting wryly observes: “testimony 
to the [Asilomar] conference’s success are 
the frequent calls to resurrect the ‘Asilomar 
Process’ to resolve the ethical dilem-
mas posed by newly emerging ideas and 
technologies” (Berg, 2004).
The fact that neuroethics is now an ‘organized specialty’ allows us to see who the key players are, who sup-
ports their work and how their interests—
and, hence, the interests of the specialty as 
represented by the Neuroethics Society—
are shaped by their social location. Among 
the six members of the executive commit-
tee and the seven members of the govern-
ing board of the Neuroethics Society, there 
are indeed scientists, ethicists and human-
ists, but nearly all, according to their web 
descriptions, are promoters of neuroscience 
and neurotechnology. Nine of these 13 have 
degrees in a branch of neuroscience such as 
neurobiology, neuropsychology, cognitive 
neuroscience or personality; the other four 
have degrees in philosophy, law or sociol-
ogy, but at least two of these individuals 
are widely known for their enthusiasm for 
science and technology. Of course, close 
association with the field of neuroscience 
is a prerequisite for those who would be 
guardians of the field, but absent among 
the leaders of the Neuroethics Society are 
respected academics who have a critical 
view of neuroscience. 
The creation of an organized specialty 
requires financial support, the source of 
which often determines the nature of the 
work that gets done and its conclusions. 
This is true for clinical research, where 
industry-supported researchers are more 
likely to discover that the drugs of their 
sponsors are efficacious (Bhandari et al, 
2004). Funding by pharmaceutical compa-
nies can also direct the agenda of centres 
for ethics  (De Vries, 2004). In the case of 
neuro ethics, most funding has come from 
the Dana Foundation, which is a private 
philanthropic organization with a strong 
interest in the brain. Although philan-
thropic funding is preferable over funding 
from for-profit corporations that exist to 
enrich owners and/or shareholders, even 
philanthropies might have axes to grind. In 
the case of the Dana Foundation, its mis-
sion is clear: to support brain research, and 
to provide information about the personal 
and public benefits of that research. Parens 
& Johnston (2006) worry about this enthu-
siasm and its effect on neuroethicists, and 
caution their fellow bioethicists that “irra-
tionally exuberant modes of reductionism 
[…] can plague hot new arenas of scientific 
and technological development. […] For 
example, proximity to geneticists may have 
made some of us ‘gen-ethicists’ too quick 
to accept claims about ‘genes for’ com-
plex human traits or about the imminence 
of engineering them. Neuroscience—in 
particular, research using neuroimages 
[Illes & Racine, 2005]—might today be 
operating in an equally exuberant mode 
[Martensen, 2004].”
There is another deeper problem with 
the way neuroethics is funded, which neuro-
ethicists share with other sorts of bioethi-
cists: the obligations of the ‘gift’. As Douglas 
(1990) points out, “A gift that does nothing 
to enhance solidarity is a contradiction,” 
and her observation is amply supported by 
the works of Mauss (1990) and Hyde (1983). 
Clinicians have begun to recognize the hid-
den costs of gifts, and an increasing number 
are refusing the free lunches, pens and tick-
ets to sporting events that are proffered by 
the pharmaceutical sales force—driven 
in large part by ‘No Free Lunch’, a not-for-
profit organization that discourages the 
acceptance of such gifts.
However, bioethicists and neuroethicists 
are in a difficult place as, unlike clinicians, 
they have nothing to sell. Physicians who 
refuse free lunches are amply supported by 
their work in the clinic, but ethicists have 
no one to bill for services rendered. Given 
this structural problem, ethicists are disin-
clined to say ‘no’ to those who seek, and 
pay for, their advice. Those who do so will 
not only lose support for their work, but 
might also find themselves excluded from 
the conversation.
The work of neuroethicists reflects the ambivalence created by their social location. Neuroethical commentary 
reveals a ‘Jekyll-and-Hyde’ struggle between 
technophilia and technophobia: reading 
this work, we learn that neuroscience is 
frightening, but we also hear of ‘bold new 
findings’, ‘remarkable scientific discoveries’ 
and ‘potential’ that is ‘almost beyond com-
prehension.’ In this ambivalence, we see the 
problem of guarding the guardians—that is, 
of guards being captured by those they are 
sent to guard.
Consider the neuroethical work on brain 
imaging, for example. The ability to ‘see’ 
which portions of the brain react to certain 
stimuli has given rise to research on how 
humans make economic, ethical and politi-
cal choices. Which part of the brain ‘lights 
up’ when we consider whether to throw a 
fat man in front of an approaching train? 
Does another part of the brain respond 
when asked to throw a switch and send the 
train down a track where it will kill a—pre-
sumably thin—workman (Greene et al, 
2001)? Which part of our brain lights up 
when asked to choose between receiving a 
$15 gift voucher today or a $20 gift voucher 
a month from now (Cassidy, 2006)?
The uncritical way in which neuroethi-
cists respond to this research is surprising to 
a social scientist. Rarely do they comment 
on the fact that images of the brain are gen-
erated when a subject is lying in a functional 
magnetic resonance imaging machine. Do 
brains respond in identical ways in the arti-
ficial environment of a scanning machine 
and in natural environments? If researchers 
discover that those who can defer gratifica-
tion use the pre-frontal cortex to deliberate 
on the gift-voucher question, whereas those 
who cannot resist $15 today are using 
the limbic part of their brain, what does that 
tell us? Yes, neuroethicists recognize that 
the “reductionist approach of neuroimaging 
to human behavior [should] be made com-
patible and complementary to approaches 
represented by philosophy, sociology and 
anthropology” (Illes & Racine, 2005), but 
most of their work proceeds as if neuro-
imaging is telling us something real, impor-
tant and frightening.
A central interest in neuroethics is brain 
science and social policy. Illes & Bird 
(2006) describe three areas of this interest: 
lie detection, cognitive enhancement and 
direct-to-consumer advertising. The authors 
point to fascinating and frightening possi-
bilities. How will we use the ability to read 
the brain and detect deception? Does neu-
ral enhancement diminish our authenticity? 
How can personal autonomy be reconciled 
with the corporate marketing of health 
…the mere presence of 
technology did not demand the 
creation of a bioethical specialty 
to act as the arbiter of ethical 
questions
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products? Notice how the technophilia/
technophobia tension shapes neuroethi-
cal questions, and also which questions 
are not asked. Missing from the discussion, 
for example, is a socio-economic critique 
of neuroscience. Little or no neuroethical 
comment can be found on the behaviour 
of pharmaceutical and medical device 
companies that have suppressed clinical 
trial data that might dampen sales and 
restrict markets (Dyer, 2004), or on the fund-
ing priorities of industries, governments, 
universities and foundations.
Neuroethics is part of the larger social 
movement of bioethics. Similarly to bio-
ethics, neuroethics works on the premise 
of a need for an ethical specialist to over-
see the work of scientists and researchers. 
Bioethics and now neuroethics are replac-
ing an older model of medical ethics that 
drew on Aristotelian ‘virtue ethics’, which 
assumes that ethical behaviour flows 
from virtuous individuals—who are well-
schooled in the humanities and attentive 
to the world around them—not from train-
ing in the responsible conduct of research, 
review of conduct by ethics committees 
and institutional review boards, or over-
sight by professional ethicists. Beginning 
in the late 1960s, for reasons briefly men-
tioned above, this model was turned on 
its head: rather than ethics guiding action, 
actions were subject to the review of pro-
fessional ethicists who were called on to 
assess and direct the behaviour of clinicians 
and researchers.
What is the best way to promote a more ethical neuroscience? Although I do not doubt that we 
need ethical reflection on neuroscience and 
neurotechnology, I believe that we need to 
think critically about how to do this.
In her story, ‘A Good Man is Hard to Find,’ 
US writer Flannery O’Connor describes a 
family outing that goes wrong. Two parents 
and their children, along with the children’s 
grandmother, leave their home in Georgia 
for a vacation in Florida. Along the way, the 
grandmother—a demanding and unpleasant 
woman—insists on a detour to see a plan-
tation that she once visited. Her son reluc-
tantly gives in, and while searching for this 
elusive destination they land in a ditch. No 
one is seriously harmed, but in this vulnera-
ble state they encounter ‘The Misfit’, a prison 
escapee who, together with his accom-
plices, systematically begins to kill every-
one in the family. The grandmother is the 
last person alive, and as she pleads with The 
Misfit for her life, she begins to see him in a 
new light: “She saw the man’s face twisted 
close to her own as if he were going to cry 
and she murmured, ‘Why you’re one of my 
babies. You’re one of my own children!’ She 
reached out and touched him on the shoul-
der. The Misfit sprang back as if a snake had 
bitten him and shot her three times through 
the chest.” Walking away, The Misfit said, 
“She would of been a good woman if it had 
been somebody there to shoot her every 
minute of her life” (O’Connor, 1993).
The difficulty, of course, is getting some-
one to ‘shoot us every minute of our lives’. 
In the case of neuroethics, it is important 
for its practitioners to remember their role 
as guardians and to avoid the predictable 
social processes that require guards for the 
guardians. Practically speaking, neuroethi-
cists should make room for some misfits 
among their leadership—academics and lay 
people who will shoot them every minute of 
their organizational lives. The presence of a 
misfit or two will help neuroethicists to ben-
efit from critical perspectives drawn from 
other disciplines, to generate a more reflex-
ive approach to their work, and to become 
less self-protective and more useful in the 
task of humanizing neuroscience. 
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